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COMMERCIAL SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT SENDS
ANOTHER VALENTINE TO ADVERTISERS
INTRODUCTION
For the 33 years since it first considered the question,1 the Supreme
Court has consistently declined to hold that "commercial speech"2 is
protected by the first amendment. Last term, however, in Bigelow v.
Virginia,3 the Court held that the commercial advertisement there in-
volved was entitled to some first amendment protection. Nonetheless,
the Court's decision may afford protection for few commercial advertise-
ments. Furthermore, these advertisements may enjoy a lesser degree of
protection than normally accorded first amendment interests.
Jeffrey Bigelow edited a weekly newspaper which was circulated
in the University of Virginia area.4 On February 8, 1971, the paper
carried an advertisement for an abortion referral service in New York
City. The item promised arrangements at "low cost" and noted that
"[a]bortions are now legal in New York [and] there are no residency
requirements." 5 Bigelow was convicted of advertising for abortions, a
misdemeanor in Virginia. 6
In upholding the conviction, the Virginia Supreme Court, on the
1. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
2. Since the Court did not define "commercial speech," the expression has lacked
the kind of meaning which lends itself to analysis. See text accompanying notes 23-33
infra.
3. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
4. Id. at 811.
5. The text of the advertisement read as follows:
UNWANTED PREGNANCY / LET US HELP YOU / Abortions are now
legal in New York / There are no residency requirements. / FOR IMMEDI-
ATE PLACEMENT IN / ACCREDITED HOSPITALS AND / CLINICS AT
LOW COST / Contact / WOMEN'S PAVILION / 515 Madison Avenue /
New York, N. Y. 10022 / or call any time / (212) 371-6670 or (212)
371-6650 / AVAILABLE 7 DAYS A WEEK / STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
We / will make all arrangements for you / and help you with information and /
counseling.
Id. at 812, citing Virginia Weekly, Feb. 8, 1971, at 2.
6. Act of March 30, 1960, ch. 358, § 18.1-63, [1960] Va. Acts 428 amended
and reenacted, Act of April 10, 1972, [1972] Va. Acts 11 1019, ch. 725 (repealed 1975):
"If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any
publication, or in any other manner, encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion or
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
The present law prohibits only encouragement of abortions to be performed in
Virginia. VA. Cona ANN. § 18.2-76.1 (1975).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
strength of Valentine v. Chrestensen,7 a 1942 Supreme Court case, held
that the advertisement was commercial speech and therefore not pro-
tected by the first amendment. 8 It held that it was within the state's
police power to prevent a woman's decision to have an abortion from
becoming subject to "commercial advertising pressure usually incidental
to the sale of a box of soap powder."'9
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed.10 In an opinion by
Justice Blackmun, the Court rejected "[t]he central assumption made
by the Supreme Court of Virginia... that the First Amendment guar-
antees of speech and press are inapplicable to paid commercial advertise-
ments.""1
The Court noted three aspects of the advertisement in Bigelow
which distinguished it from the purely commercial advertising which
had been held unprotected. First, the advertisement did more than
simply propose a commercial transaction. It contained "factual material
of clear 'public interest.' "12 On this point, the Court cited the references
in the advertisement to the New York abortion law and the fact that a
referral agency existed in New York.13 Second, the activity advertised
"pertained to constitutional interests,"'14 that is, to abortion. Third,
the advertised activity was legal in New York.15
The Court asserted that all advertising "may be subject to rea-
sonable regulation that serves a legitimate public interest." 10 It there-
fore applied a balancing test and determined that the public's interests
in the speech 7 outweighed the "little, if any"'18 legitimate interest which
7. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
8. Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1972).
9. Id. at 196, 191 S.E.2d at 176.
10. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). In 1973, the Supreme Court vacated the conviction.
413 U.S. 909 (1973). It remanded for consideration in light of the abortion cases, Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Virginia
Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, saying that Bigelow was a first amendment
case, not an abortion case. 214 Va. 341, 200 S.E.2d 680 (1973).
11. 421 U.S. at 818.




16. Id. at 826.
17. In the section of its opinion which balanced the interests at stake, the Court
did not state whose interests in the speech it was considering. However, it had earlier
identified the interests of the general public in obtaining information about abortion
laws and the interests of those who might wish to have an abortion. Id. at 822. The
Court noted that appellant's case was strengthened by the fact that he was prosecuted




the state had in regulating the advertisement of services provided in
New York. 19
Justices Rehnquist and White, dissenting, argued that the adver-
tisement was no more than a simple commercial proposition,20 that
Virginia did have a legitimate interest in regulating it,21 and that the
regulation was reasonable.22
I. HISTORY OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
The seminal case in the commercial speech area, and the principal
obstacle for the Bigelow court, was Valentine.23 In that case, the Court
upheld the conviction of a submarine tour promoter under a New
York City ordinance which prohibited the distribution of commercial
handbills in public areas.24 Citing no authority, the Court found that
commercial handbills were not protected by the first amendment.25
Valentine did not define commercial speech or articulate a rationale
for banishing it from the first amendment. Later Supreme Court cases
indicated that "commercial speech" must include, at a minimum, pro-
posal of a transaction for profit, even if the transaction is related to
constitutional interests. In Martin v. Struthers,6 an ordinance banning
solicitation at residences without prior permission of the owner was
held unconstitutional as applied to a defendant selling religious tracts
at cost. In Breard v. Alexandria,2 7 however, the same type of ordinance
19. Before discussing the commercial speech issue, the Court considered the
contention that the statute was facially overbroad. It declined to rest its holding on
this point because there had been no prosecution other than Bigelow's and because the
statute had subsequently been amended to cover only illegal abortions to be performed
in Virginia. Id. at 815-18.
In its discussion of commercial speech, the Court was careful to note that the
advertisement was not "deceptive or fraudulent" and that it did not invade the
privacy of readers. Id. at 828. It also noted that the Virginia law could seriously inter-
fere with interstate publications. Id. at 828-29.
20. Id. at 831.
21. Id. at 832-33.
22. Id. at 836.
23. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
24. Valentine was convicted of violating § 318 of the Sanitary Code of the City
of New York, now CiTY OF N.Y. ADmINISTRATIVE CODE § 755(2)-7.0(5) (1970). A
conviction for distributing handbills for a jazz concert was reversed recently by the
New York courts. People v. Remeny, 79 Misc. 2d 160, 359 N.Y.S.2d 504 (N.Y.C. Crim.
Ct. 1974), rev'd, 367 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1975).
25. 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
26. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
27. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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was held constitutional as applied to a defendant selling magazine sub-
scriptions for profit.2
In 1973, in Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations,2 the Court focused on the limited content of the speech in
Valentine as justification for its treatment as commercial speech. The
Court said: "The critical feature of the advertisement in Valentine v.
Chrestensen was that, in the Court's view, it did no more than propose
a commercial transaction, the sale of admission to a submarine."8 0
Recent lower court decisions have also listed the profit motive81 and
proposals of a transaction 2 as factors in determining the scope of com-
mercial speech.
These criteria for identifying commercial speech seem to be merely
definitional expressions for the most often-stated rationale for denying
protection to commercial speech. The rationale is that such speech is
unrelated to the expression of opinions and grievances which the first
amendment was intended to protect. As the District of Columbia Circuit
stated in Banzhaf v. FCC:
[P]roduct advertising... is not ordinarily associated with any of the
interests the First Amendment seeks to protect. As a rule, it does not
affect the political process, does not contribute to the exchange of
ideas, does not provide information on matters of public importance,
and is not, except perhaps for the ad-men, a form of individual self-
expression.33
28. The importance of the profit motive in the definition of commercial speech
is weakened, however, by the Court's frequent statement that the presence of com-
mercial activity alone is not enough to deprive speech of first amendment protection.
See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474-75 & nn.16-19 (1966). The
Bigelow Court cited Ginzburg for this proposition. 421 U.S. at 818. This reference is
somewhat ironic, since Ginzburg was convicted of obscenity on the basis of pandering,
the commercial exploitation of sex. 383 U.S. at 467.
29. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
30. Id. at 385.
31. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, 474 F.2d 115, 121-22 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); Stevenson v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Tex., 393 F. Supp. 812, 819 (W.D. Tex. 1975); United States v. Mintzes, 304 F.
Supp. 1305, 1312 (D. Md. 1969). See also Virginia Citizens Consumer Council v.
State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974), prob. juris. noted, 420 U.S.
971 (1975), citing and comparing with Patterson Drug Corp. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp.
821 (W.D. Va. 1969).
32. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 212 n.9 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 934 (1972) (expressions of discrimination protected unless made in the context of
a commercial transaction).
33. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 842 (1969). Banzhaf presented a peculiar problem because smoking had been
found an issue of public interest by the FCC. Given this, how could statements on that
issue not be protected by the first amendment? The court was able to duck the issue
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While Valentine flatly held that commercial speech was unpro-
tected by the first amendment, dictum in Pittsburgh Press suggested
that commercial speech might be entitled to some protection.8 4 Degrees
of protection accorded commercial speech in the lower courts ranged
from extreme deference to the regulation,35 to "balancing tests," 3 to
strongly protective standards.37
by noting that its holding, requiring equal time for counter-advertisements, would mean
"the first amendment gain is greater than the loss." 405 F.2d at 1102. (The "loss"
feared was deterrence of cigarette advertisements.) See also Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973): "None [of the advertise-
ments in question] expresses a position on whether, as a matter of social policy, certain
positions ought to be filled by members of one or the other sex, nor do any of them
criticize the Ordinance or the Commission's enforcement practices."
The FCC has modified its stand on the application of the fairness doctrine to
product advertising. Now, only an advertisement which presents "a meaningful statement
which obviously addresses, and advocates a point of view on, a controversial issue of
public importance" requires a fairness response. Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest
Standards, 39 Fed. Reg. 26372, 26381 (1974). This change has been upheld in the
context of snowmobile advertisements. Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522
F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1975).
34.
Pittsburgh Press goes on to argue that if this package of advertisement
and placement is commercial speech, then commercial speech should be ac-
corded a higher level of protection than Chrestensen and its progeny would
suggest. . . .
Whatever the merits of this contention may be in other contexts it is
unpersuasive in this case. Discrimination in employment is not only com-
mercial activity, it is illegal commercial activity.
Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973)
(footnote omitted).
35. United States v. Hunter, 324 F. Supp. 529, 534 (D. Md. 1971), aff'd, 459
F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972): "Whether the homeowner
should be denied the right to intimate his [racial] preference or limitation in an ad-
vertisement is a matter for the Congress .... "
36. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, 474 F.2d 115, 122 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973) ("informational value" of prohibited speech is "clearly
outweighed" by governmental interest in preventing blockbusting); cf. Banzhaf v. FCC,
405 F.2d 1082, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969) (promoting
the sale of a product is "a form of merchandising subject to limitation for public pur-
poses like other business practices"). See also Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't,
300 F. Supp. 1036, 1044 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) ("commercial
element ' of speech "does substantially reduce the weight of the expression on the con-
stitutional scales") (Hufsteder, J., concurring).
37. Hiett v. United States, 415 F.2d 664, 671 (5th Cir. 1969) ("overwhelming
public interests" would be required to support law regulating solicitation of Mexican
divorces); Mitchell Family Planning v. City of Royal Oaks, 335 F. Supp. 738, 742
(E.D. Mich. 1972) (clear and present danger test applied to abortion billboard ad-
vertisement); cf. Veterans & Reservists for Peace in Vietnam v. Regional Comm'r of
Customs, 459 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1972) (compelling governmental interest in preventing
currency flow to certain countries justifies registration provisions of the Trading with
the Enemy Act); Concerned Consumers League v. O'Neill, 371 F. Supp. 644, 647
(E.D. Wis. 1974) (consumer picketing of store held protected; state restriction of
protected modes of expression "can never be justified by the content of the expression").
1976]
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II. THE BIGELOW OPINION
The Court in Bigelow might have chosen to abandon the nebulous
distinction between commercial speech and other speech. It had left
open that possibility in Pittsburgh Press.3s However, the Bigelow Court
continued the distinction but afforded more first amendment protection
to some commercial speech than it had formerly given.
A. The Definitional Problem in Bigelow
"Commercial speech" is one of the few areas of speech which have
in the past been denied first amendment protection. Others include
fighting words,39 obscenity,40 libel,41 and incitement.42 The Court has
justified exclusion of libel and fighting words on the grounds that they
do not contribute to the exposition of ideas and inflict injury by their
very utterance.43 The Court has not confronted as thoroughly the ra-
tionale for excluding obscenity; this may be one reason why obscenity
is such a troublesome area for the Court.44 As mentioned above,46 the
courts in defining "commercial speech," have often used criteria which
are seemingly irrelevant to first amendment values, and which have
been held irrelevant in other contexts.46 In Bigelow, the Court came
closer to making the definition fit the rationale for protecting some
speech and denying protection to other speech. That is, the Court
examined the speech to see if, contrary to the speech involved in
Banzhaf,4 7 it "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited
38. See note 34 supra.
39. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
40. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
41. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) ; ef. Gertz v. Robert Welch
Inc.. 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
42. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
43. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
44. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAWV, CASES & MATERIALS 1282 (9th ed.
1975); Note, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YALE L.J. 1364 (1966).
45. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
46. The profit motive of publishers and distributors, respectively, had been held
irrelevant to protection in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964),
and Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959). As noted, frequent dicta suggest
that the profit motive of the speaker is irrelevant. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 531 (1945).
47. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969); see note 33 supra.
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grievances, protested claimed abuses . *... ,,4sThe Court's means of
making this examihation, however, are open to criticism. 49
In determining whether the advertisement fell within the area of
protected speech, the Court first noted the factual material of interest
to the public contained therein.50 The "public interest" test has been
tried and discarded in the context of libel.51 "Public interest" may
include either those items in which the public is interested, or those
which the public should know. If it means the former, it affords no
method for distinguishing cases-the public may be interested in al-
most anything.52 If it means the latter, it puts judges in the position of
deciding "what information is relevant to self-government." 53 Though
criticized, this seems to b& what the Court has done in other instances
where it has refused protection to categories of speech.54 This is es-
pecially true in the area of obscenity, which, unlike fighting words,
libel, and incitement, does not inflict harm by its mere utterance5 5 If
one accepts the obscenity decisions, one cannot object to courts decid-
ing what people should see and hear.56
A second objection to the public interest standard was that it would
lead to constant ad hoc balancing of the state interest in regulation
against the first amendment interest. This kind of ad hoc balancing in
48. 421 U.S. at 821, citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266
(1964).
49. The Court first avoided Valentine by noting it concerned only regulation
of the manner of expression. 421 U.S. at 819. This is arguably true, but it seemed to
have gone unnoticed by the Supreme Court in upholding the content regulation in
Pittsburgh Press, and by the lower courts in cases cited at note 36 supra.
50. 421 U.S. at 822. The Court's reference to "factual" material is interesting. In
other contexts, statements of opinion have been given paramount protection, perhaps
on the theory that there are no truths in, for example, the area of politics. See, e.g.,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The fact that commercial speech
is factual, apparently meaning "verifiable," has been given as a reason for excluding
it from first amendment protection. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d
Cir. 1971); Developments in the Law, Deceptive Advertising, 80 HAv. L. REv. 1005,
1030 (1967). The "factual" reference in Bigelow may mean "truthful"; the Court may
be steering clear of the problem of deceptive advertising. See Virginia State Bd. of
Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1830 n.24 (1976).
51. Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
52. See, e.g., Comment, The Right of Privacy: Normative-Descriptive Confusion
in the Defense of Newsworthiness, 30 U. CHi. L. REv. 722 (1963).
53. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
54. See text accompanying notes 43 & 44 supra.
55. That is, it does not inflict a regulable harm by its utterance. See Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Katz, Privacy & Pornography, Stanley v. Georgia, 1969
Sup. CT. REv. 203, 204. But see United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
56. The "public interest" test has been applied in two cases since Bigelow; in
neither instance was the speech protected. See text accompanying notes 108 & 109 infra.
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the libel area, it was believed, would lead to a lack of predictability and
to self-censorship.57 However, the need for certainty is not as great in
the area of commercial speech, for both practical and legal reasons.
Practically, advertisements generally are not written under the same
kind of deadline pressures as news stories; there is time to assess their
legal implications and even to ask for an opinion of counsel. Legally,
under the "reasonable regulation" standard of protection enunciated
in Bigelow, the degree of protection will depend on ad hoc balancing
anyway.5 8 Some additional balancing in the definitional area should
not result in significantly greater uncertainty.
The Court in Bigelow also noted that the statements in the ad-
vertisement "pertained to constitutional interests," and cited the 1973
abortion cases, Roe and Doe.59 If reference to constitutional interests
is necessary for first amendment protection of an advertisement, how-
ever, the scope of the protection could be either very broad or very
narrow. The subjects of constitutional litigation are diverse but few
interests are afforded great protection. It is difficult to see this argument
as anything more than a makeweight. Strictly construed, the constitu-
tional interest found in Roe and Doe was privacy.Y0 Arguably, the free-
dom from intrusion is hindered, not helped, by the protection given
the advertisement in Bigelow. Those finding abortion a distasteful
subject now may be forced to see it advertised on billboards. Those
considering having an abortion may have their decisions influenced by
advertising pressure "usually incidental to the sale of a box of soap
powder."' 1 Therefore, the "constitutional interest" argument can only
help support first amendment protection for the advertisement if it is
seen as an aspect of the "public interest" test, a way of bringing the
speech into the more traditional first amendment category of speech
related to government.
In sum, the Court concentrated on the content of the advertisement
and found that it contained items of sufficient value to warrant pro-
tection. The dissent questioned whether the protection should differ if
57. See generally Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 78 (1971) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Comment, The Expanding Constitutional Protection for the News Media
from Liability for Defamation: Predictability and the New Synthesis, 70 Micix. L. Rv.
1547 (1972).
58. 421 U.S. at 825-26; see text accompanying notes 71-78 infra.
59. 421 U.S. at 822, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973).
60. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
61. Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 191, 196, 191 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1972).
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such public interest information were added to an otherwise unpro-
tected advertisement.6 2 The majority did not deal with this point; the
opinion therefore leaves open the possibility that future courts may
find the advertisement unprotected despite the attempted evasion of
the regulation.
By concentrating on the content of the advertisement, the Court
implicitly rejected the publisher's argument that the advertisement was
entitled to first amendment protection as a result of his "implicit edi-
torial endorsement" of its content.6 3
The Court's focus on the text of the advertisement also bodes ill
for efforts by commentators to find theoretical justifications for pro-
tection of commercial speech."4 In the most extensive of the comments,6 5
Martin Redish argued that commercial advertising is an effective means
of furthering the first amendment interest of individual self-fulfill-
ment.66 Advertisements, he argued, provide information which enables
an individual to solve problems which to him may be more important
and interesting than those discussed in much traditionally protected
speech.6 7 Such a theory would extend protection even to advertise-
ments which do no more than propose a commercial transaction. While
the Court did not adopt this view in Bigelow, 6s it did move toward
such a position in a recent case involving advertising of drug prices. 69
62. 421 U.S. at 832. This problem was presented to the Valentine Court, which
ignored the "public interest information." 316 U.S. at 55. In that case, however, it was
clear that the information was added "with the intent, and for the purpose of, evading
the prohibition of the ordinance." Id.
63. 421 U.S. at 822 n.7. The Court also did not consider whether the transaction
really "related to . . . social activity involving the system of property rights rather than
free expression." T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST ADMEND-
MENT 105 n.46 (1966). An abortion is hardly a typical example of commercial activity
by a woman. It may have been commercial activity on the part of the referral service,
but it was the public's interest in the speech that was being considered. See note 17
supra.
64. Bird, Goldman & Lawrence, Corporate Image Advertising, 51 J. URBAN L.
405 (1974); DeVore & Nelson, Commercial Speech and Paid Access to the Press, 26
HASTINOS L.J. 745 (1975); Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Com-
mercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 429 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Redish]; Comment, The First Amendment and Consumer Protec-
tion: Commercial Advertising as Protected Speech, 50 ORE. L. REv. 177 (1971).
65. Redish, supra note 64.
66. Id. at 438-41, 443-47.
67. Id. at 441.
68. 421 U.S. at 821-22.
69. 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976). The Court held that a state law banning drug price
advertising by pharmacists violated the first amendment. Although it noted individual
customers' interests in drug prices, it ultimately tied the first amendment protection to
a "public" interest. According to the Court, the "free flow of commercial information"
1976]
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Given the Court's concentration on the text in Bigelow, and its
efforts to compare the advertisement to traditionally protected speech
and to distinguish it from the typical commercial advertisement, the
case could be characterized as one not based upon the "commercial
speech" doctrine at all. Instead, it may simply be the converse of Valen-
tine. 0 Valentine, simply put, held that the presence of some protected
speech could not save an otherwise regulable handbill from regulation.
Bigelow may be said to hold merely that where there is otherwise pro-
tected non-commercial speech, its use in a commercial context will not
strip it of all protection. The commercial speech alone-the offer of
services, statement of price, and praise of the product-was not pro-
tected by Bigelow.
The New York Court of Appeals recently adopted this reasoning
in upholding the constitutionality of the state's ban on drug price ad-
vertising.71 In Urowsky v. Board of Regents of the State University,72
the court discussed Bigelow, despite holding that the appellant, a phar-
macist, had no standing to assert his customers' first amendment rights.13
Judge Gabrielli, writing for five members of the court, construed Bige-
low as not affording first amendment protection to purely commercial
speech. 4 He also noted Bigelow's explicit preservation of cases involv-
ing regulation of professions.7 5 An alternative rationale for the court's
holding was touched upon briefly in the opinion: since price informa-
tion is required to be made available at pharmacies, 7 only the manner
of speech, not the content, is regulated.77 Even without Bigelow, this
would allow a balancing of interests.78 The court's upholding of such
a severe restriction on manner of speech emphasizes that it found no
is "indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system [and]
to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or
altered." Id. at 1827.
70. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
71. 8 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 63.3(c), (m) (1971).
72. 38 N.Y.2d 364, 342 N.E.2d 583, 379 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1975). This case was
overruled by Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976). See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
73. 38 N.Y.2d at 369, 342 N.E.2d at 586, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
74. Id. at 370, 342 N.E.2d at 587, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
75. Id. at 370, 342 N.E.2d at 586-87, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
76. 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 63.3(m) (1971).
77. 38 N.Y.2d at 371, 342 N.E.2d at 587, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 821. This character-
ization of the regulation is not quite accurate, since the regulation was directed at
advertising with a particular content. See, e.g., Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study
in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV.
L. REv. 1482, 1497 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Ely].
78. See notes 82-84 infra and accompanying text.
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weighty first amendment interest in drug price information. The court
criticized the dissent for failing to make the distinction between speech
regarding the availability of drugs and that regarding only the price of
drugs.79 It did not address the question of whether a drug which a con:
sumer cannot afford is really "available" to the consumer. While most
of the opinion is dictum, Urowsky clearly means that Bigelow will not
be used in New York to narrow the category of unprotected speech.
In dissent, Judge Fuchsberg argued that the majority was following
Valentine, and that "Bigelow plainly disavowed Valentine." 0  He urged
a test of "real necessity" rather than "rational basis" for regulation of
commercial speech.81
Even if the New York court had found drug price advertising
within the ambit of Bigelow, the "balancing" test adopted by the Bige-
low Court might not have required a much higher standard of review.
B. The Degree of Protection Afforded Commercial Speech
Free speech cases may be divided roughly into two classes: those
involving restrictions of content and those involving restrictions of
time, place or manner of speech. The Court generally has voided regu-
lations of expression aimed at content, unless the content is within
a category that has been held unprotected.8 2 (It can also be argued
that in such cases the Court has balanced the interests in the speech
against the interests in the regulation.) 83 Regulations involving the
79. 38 N.Y.2d at 371, 342 N.E.2d at 587, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 821.
80. Id. at 374, 342 N.E.2d at 590, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
81. Id. at 374, 342 N.E.2d at 589, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
82. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18-22 (1971); Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942) ; Ely, supra note 77, at 1491-93. See also notes 39-42 supra.
83. See, e.g., Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 171 (1972). For an interesting
contrast in views, compare Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing
Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. Rav. 1001, 1006-08 (1972), with
Ely, supra note 77, at 1492-93, 1497 n.59. Both cite Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971). Ely contends it is an example of the categorization technique; Gunther
says it is an example of balancing. Ely seems to provide the more satisfactory explana-
tion of what the Court has been doing. Gunther, for example, cites Healey as an ex-
ample of balancing. In that case, a college sought to deny recognition to a local chapter
of the Students for a Democratic Society. The Court spoke of the first amendment
"strik[ing] the required balance." 408 U.S. at 171. But the only valid state interest
found was freedom from disruptive conduct-an interest not related to the content of
expression. 408 U.S. at 191. The case, then, is consistent with the "categorization" ap-
proach. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
As Bigelow shows, however, iategorization cannot explain all of the Court's decisions
in similar recent cases. See also the "debate" between Laurent Frantz and Prof. Wallace
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manner of expression have been upheld if they further a substantial
governmental interest, the interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression, and the restriction of expression is no greater than
necessary.8
The regulation in Bigelow was clearly aimed at the content of
the speech. The Court first invoked a categorization approach,8 and
purported to find advertising a protected category. 8  Yet the Court
asserted that advertising, "like all public expression, may be subject
to reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate public interest,"87 and
applied a balancing test more appropriate to incidental restrictions
on the manner of speech. Even the dissent indicated that the Court's
weighing of the value of speech in a protected category was improper.88
The Court held that the public's interests in the speech outweighed the
state's interest in regulating it.80
The cases cited in support of the Court's test include one in-
volving a restriction on content,90 an ambiguous case,9 ' and several
involving restrictions on the manner of speech. 92 The citation, in a
Mendelson in Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Mendelson,
51 CALIF. L. REv. 729 (1963); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE
L.J. 1424 (1962); Mendelson, The First Amendment and the Judicial Process: A Reply
to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REv. 479 (1964); Mendelson, On the Meaning of the
First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962).
84. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961).
85. 421 U.S. at 818-19.
86. Id. at 820.
87. Id. at 826.
88. The dissent argued:
If the Court's decision does indeed turn upon its conclusion that the
advertisement here in question was protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, the subject of the advertisement ought to make no difference.
• . * [We have always refused to distinguish for First Amendment purposes
on the basis of content ....
421 U.S. at 831. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 826-29. Invalidation without "balancing" would seem mandated by the
"categorization" approach. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1974),
citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Ely, supra note 77. A
reasoning process parallel to that in Bigelow can be seen in Virginia State Bd. of Pharm.
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976). The Court found
commercial speech not "wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment." Id. at
1825. It discounted the state's interest in regulation, and held the speech protected. Id.
at 1828-30.
90. Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973).
91. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
92. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S.
290 (1951); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
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case involving content, of cases that concerned restrictions of the man-
ner of speech reinforces the impression that the Court continues to
give commercial speech less than full first amendment protection.
It is impossible to ascertain from the facts of the Bigelow case,
however, what state interests would be weighty enough to justify the
regulation of commercial speech. Over a strong dissent, 93 the Court
held that Virginia's interest "in shielding its citizens from information
about activities outside Virginia's borders"94 was entitled to "little, if
any, weight under the circumstances."9 5
Some indication of the Court's attitude, however, may be gained
by examining its preservation, in a footnote, of earlier decisions in-
volving advertising.96 The Court noted:
Wholly apart from the respective rationales that may have been
developed by the courts in 'those cases, their results are not incon-
sistent with our holding here. In those cases there usually existed a
clear relationship 'between the advertising in question and an activity
that the government was legitimately regulatingY7
Two of the cases, United States v. Bob Lawrence RealtyB and
United States v. Hunter,99 involved direct prohibitions of speech con-
cerning race in connection with a real estate transaction.100 If com-
mercial speech were receiving full first amendment protection, either
the restrictions would have to be stricken outright, or there would have
to be an analysis of the state interests and possible alternatives less
detrimental to free speech.101 Both cases relied on Valentine,10 2 and
the court in Bob Lawrence held that "[t]he only 'speech' proscribed
• . . is commercial speech."'1 3 From the Court's preservation of these
cases, one can only conclude that commercial speech is still receiving
93. 421 U.S. at 834-35.
94. Id. at 827-28.
95. Id. at 828.
96. Id. at 825 n.10.
97. Id.
9"8. 474 F.2d 115, (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973).
99. 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
100. In Bob Lawrence, the statute prohibited blockbusting, that is, representing
that blacks are moving into the neighborhood, in order to induce whites to sell. See Civil
Rights Act of 1968 § 804(e), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1970). In Hunter, advertising in-
dicating racial preference in the rental of housing was prohibited. See Civil Rights Act
of 1968 § 804(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1970). The advertiser in the case fell within
the "Mrs. Murphy" exemption. 459 F.2d 213 n.10.
101. See Ely, supra note 77, at 1197; text accompanying note 82 supra.
102. See 474 F.2d at 122; 459 F.2d at 211.
103. 474 F.2d at 122.
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far less protection than is usually accorded by the first amendment to
other types of speech. 104
In footnote ten, the Court stated that its holding was not in con-
flict with earlier cases concerning regulation of broadcasting and regu-
lation of business advertising.10 5 One case already has held that Bigelow
does not require a change in the treatment of broadcast regulations. 1 6
Suits now pending will test the constitutionality of regulations con-
cerning professional advertising.0 7
CONCLUSION
While Bigelow may be viewed as dealing with "commercial
speech," its real emphasis is on non-commercial speech in a commercial
context. This approach, and the Court's concentration on the text of
the advertisement, will necessarily limit its impact. The revival of the
"public interest" test, although a potential tool for broadening Bige-
low's scope, may not have that effect in practice. Two courts already
have rejected arguments based on this test. 08 In one case, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal held that maps showing the location of movie
stars' homes were not protected:
[flo gain the protection of the First Amendment over its dis-
semination, commercial speech must contain (in good faith) at least
some information or opinion on sociological, educational, religious
104. The dissent read footnote 10 to imply that the Court "does not intend the
results which might otherwise come from a literal reading of its opinion." 421 U.S. at
836.
It would be hard to conclude that the advertisement in Hunter and the statements
in Bob Lawrence were not the kind of commercial speech which should be protected
under the Court's rationale in Bigelow. Both were information of public interest and
pertained to constitutional interests. The advertisement in Hunter was also an im-
plicit endorsement of a position on a controversial issue.
105. Id. at 825 n.10. On regulation of broadcasting, the Court cited, inter alia,
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
106. Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060 (Ist Cir. 1975).
107. See, e.g., Consumers Union v. State Bar of Cal., No. 75-2385SC (N.D. Cal.,
filed Nov. 13, 1975); Niles v. Loewe, No. CV75-322 (D. Hawaii, filed Sept. 24, 1975);
Person v. Association of the Bar of the City of N.Y., No. 75C-987 (E.D.N.Y., filed
June 23, 1975); Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, Civil No. 75-629A (E.D. Va., filed
Sept. 29, 1975); Consumers Union of the United States v. ABA, No. 75-0105-R (E.D.
Va., filed Feb. 27, 1975); Cairo v. State Bar of Wis., No. 75-C-606 (E.D. Wis., filed
Oct. 21, 1975).
108. Wortham v. Dun & Bradstreet, 399 F. Supp. 633, 638 n.2 (W.D. Tex. 1975)(libel suit based on credit report; report was for a "strictly limited subscription audi-
ence"); Welton v. City of Los Angeles, - Cal. App. 2d -, 124 Cal. Rptr. 480
(2d Dist.), accepted for hearing, --- Cal. 3d - , No. 75-188, 75-189 (1975).
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or political matters-generally the kind of discourse upon public ques-
tions the founding fathers sought to protect as fundamental to the
effective functioning of the participatory democracy. (See Bige-
low .... ) 109
If other lower courts adopt this reading of Bigelow, it will have only
minimal impact on advertising.110
Bigelow's "reasonable regulation" standard may actually result in
less protection for some commercial advertising. As noted above, some
courts had already adopted a higher standard of protection for com-
mercial speech than is now required by Bigelow.". The standard could
also encourage arguments proposing the regulation of speech now pro-
tected by the first amendment. If traditionally protected speech could
be shown to have a commercial aspect, the standard for first amend-
ment protection might be lowered to the "reasonable regulation"
standard.
Consideration of further cases by the Court is necessary before the
impact of Bigelow's "balancing" test can be determined. It is not clear
at present whether this test represents a new means of first amendment
analysis or whether the case will become merely a sport in free speech
doctrine.
DAVID SHERIDAN
109. Welton v. City of Los Angeles, - Cal. App. 2d - , , 124 Cal.
Rptr. 480, 483 (2d Dist.), accepted for hearing, - Cal. 3d -, No. 75-189 (1975).
110. Bigelow's importance also is diminished by the fact that some restrictions
on commercial advertising are coming under attack on grounds other than the first
amendment. For example, the American Bar Association has voted to allow some
advertising for lawyers. A.B.A. Clears Way for Lawyers' Ads, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18,
1976, at 13, col. 1. The Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on commercial speech
is small comfort to those seeking a first amendment basis for advertising of professional
services. The majority in Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., reserved the question. 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1831 n.25 (1976). Chief Justice
Burger, concurring, suggested that advertising of prices for professional services may be
"inherently misleading." Id. at 1832.
111. See note 37 supra.
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